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Abstract
The increasing use of three-dimensional modeling and digitization techniques in archaeology has raised questions about 
the digital rights management of the resulting 3D models. Curators of valuable artifacts and creators of 3D models may 
be reluctant to openly share the digital 3D representations due to fear of misuse or theft of their data and intellectual 
property. In order to address these concerns, we have investigated a number of techniques for sharing and disseminating 
3D models in a secure, protected manner. We have implemented and deployed one such technique, remote 3D rendering, 
on a wide scale. Our remote rendering system has been used successfully to make thousands of 3D models freely available 
for interactive visualization, including archaeological artifacts, digitized statuary, and reconstructions of ancient urban sites, 
while preventing copying or other unauthorized access to the underlying 3D data.
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1. Introduction
The increasing use of three­dimensional modeling 
and digitization techniques in archaeology has raised 
questions about the digital rights management of 
the resulting 3D models. While the digital rights 
management problem of protecting data from 
theft and misuse has previously been addressed 
for a variety of other information types (software 
code, digital 2D images, audio and video files), few 
technological solutions are designed specifically to 
protect interactive 3D graphics content.
The demand for protecting 3D graphical models 
is significant and growing, driven by needs in the 
cultural heritage community. Contemporary 3D 
digitization technologies allow the efficient creation 
of accurate 3D models of many physical objects. The 
Stanford Digital Michelangelo Project, for example, 
has developed a high­resolution digital archive of 
10 of Michelangelo’s large statues, including the 
David (Levoy et al. 2000). These statues represent 
the artistic patrimony of Italy’s cultural institutions, 
and the contract with the Italian authorities permits 
the distribution of the 3D models only to established 
scholars for non-commercial use. Although everyone 
involved would like the models to be widely available 
for all constructive purposes, the digital 3D models 
of the statues might be pirated and misused if they 
were distributed without protection. For example, 
simulated marble replica statuettes of the David 
might be manufactured from the 3D data, violating 
the provisions of the contracts that authorized the 
digitization and creation of the model.
Digital archives of archaeological artifacts are 
another example of cultural heritage 3D models that 
might require digital rights protection. Curators 
of such artifact collections increasingly turn to 3D 
digitization as a way to preserve and widen scholarly 
use of their holdings, but they often desire to maintain 
strict control over the use of the 3D data and guard 
against theft. An example of such a collection is the 
Digital Forma Urbis Romae Project (Koller et al. 
2006), a collaboration with Italian archaeological 
officials that has digitized over one thousand marble 
fragments of an ancient Roman map and made them 
publically available through a web­based database, 
while taking measures to prevent copying of the 
3D data. Other 3D graphics application areas with 
intellectual property concerns include character 
modeling for animated films, content for video games, 
human body scans, CAD, and online commerce 
(VRML, etc.).
Prior technical research in the area of intellectual 
property protection for 3D data has primarily 
addressed 3D digital watermarking techniques. These 
steganographic approaches have sought to embed 
hidden information into 3D graphical models, with 
varying degrees of robustness to attacks aimed at 
disabling the watermarks by altering the 3D shape or 
data representation. Many of the most successful 3D 
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watermarking schemes are based on spread-spectrum 
frequency domain transformations, embedding 
watermarks at multiple scales by introducing 
controlled perturbations into the coordinates of the 
3D model vertices (Praun et al. 1999). Complementary 
technologies search collections of 3D models and 
examine them for the presence of digital watermarks, 
in an effort to detect piracy.
To adequately protect valuable 3D objects such as 
cultural heritage artifacts, however, it is not sufficient 
to detect piracy after the fact; we must instead 
prevent it from happening in the first place. The 
computing industry has experimented with a number 
of techniques for preventing unauthorized access to 
digital data, including physical dongles, node-locked 
and networked licensing schemes, copy prevention 
software, obfuscation, and encryption with embedded 
keys. Most are these schemes can eventually be 
broken or bypassed by determined attackers, causing 
undue inconvenience and expense for nonmalicious 
users. High-profile data and software is particularly 
susceptible to attackers.
Fortunately, 3D graphics data differs from most 
other forms of digital media in that the presentation 
format, 2D images, is fundamentally differently from 
its underlying representation as 3D geometry. Usually, 
3D graphics data is visualized as a projection onto a 
2D display device, resulting in a large information 
loss for single views. This property suggests that 
protected 3D graphics systems can perhaps still be 
highly useful to users, without making all the 3D 
data as vulnerable to piracy as other types of digital 
content.
Our goal is to address the problem of preventing 
the theft of 3D cultural heritage models, while still 
sharing them and allowing for their interactive 
display and manipulation. We attempt to provide 
a solution for maintainers of large collections of 
high-resolution static 3D models (such as digitized 
cultural heritage artifacts). The methods we have 
developed aim to protect both the physical shape 
of the 3D models and their particular geometric 
representation (such as 3D mesh vertex coordinates, 
surface normals, and connectivity information). We 
accept that the coarse shape of visible objects can be 
easily reproduced regardless of any protection efforts, 
so we concentrate on defending the high­resolution 
geometric detail of 3D models. This detailed geometry 
is usually the most expensive to model or measure 
(perhaps requiring special access and advanced 3D 
digitizing technology), and is often the most valuable 
in exhibiting fidelity to the original object.
2. Protection Techniques for 3D Models
Data in the 3D graphics pipeline is vulnerable to an 
attacker in a variety of ways when displaying a 3D 
model on a personal computer. The possible means 
of attack include:
 – 3D model file reverse-engineering. If users 
have full access to 3D model data files, they can 
reverse­engineer even obfuscated or encrypted 
file formats.
 – 3D viewer application tampering. Hackers can 
use techniques such as program tracing and 
memory dumping to obtain access to data in use 
by application programs.
 – Graphics driver tampering. 3D data passes 
through graphics driver software on its way to the 
graphics hardware; the drivers are vulnerable to 
tampering or replacement by attackers to capture 
streams of 3D data.
 – Reconstruction from the framebuffer. 
Sophisticated attackers could access rendered 
images from the graphics memory and use 3D 
computer vision techniques to reconstruct the 
original model.
 – Reconstruction from the final image display. 
Regardless of any system protections in the 
pipeline, the final video images output from a 
graphics system are also vulnerable to capture 
and reconstruction.
To counter these possible attacks, we have 
considered several possible approaches for protected 
rendering of 3D graphics:
 – Software-only rendering. By bypassing the 
graphics processing unit (GPU) driver and 
hardware, a strict software rendering approach 
can maintain complete control of the rendering 
process within a specialized 3D viewing 
application that uses obfuscation techniques 
to protect the 3D data in the early stages of the 
pipeline, at the expense of trading off display 
performance.
 – Hybrid hardware/software rendering. To partially 
leverage GPU acceleration, one can render a 
subset of the model via software, and the rest 
via hardware. Alternatively, the transform and 
lighting stage of rendering can be performed in 
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software, while leaving the rasterization stage to 
the graphics hardware.
 – Deformations in the geometry. The 3D viewing 
application can introduce subtle deformations 
in the geometry of the 3D model before passing 
the 3D vertex data to the graphics driver, so that 
attackers would have difficulty reconstructing the 
full 3D model due to the distortions.
 – Hardware decryption in the GPU. If 3D models 
were encrypted using public-key encryption when 
they are created, then specially-designed GPUs 
could accept this encrypted data and perform on­
chip decryption and rendering.
 – Image-based rendering. Image-based graphics 
data representations, such as light fields (Levoy 
and Hanrahan 1996), are densely sampled 
data structures that do not explicitly include 
a geometric description for the 3D shape, yet 
are still amenable to interactive and accurate 
display.
 – Encrypted computation rendering. Recent 
research in encrypted computation suggests 
that 3D rendering directly from encrypted 
representations of the 3D model may be possible, 
although the computational complexity is 
extremely high and currently prohibitive.
 – Remote (network) rendering. The 3D model data 
can be retained on a secure server, under the 
contol of the content owner, and the server pass 
only 2D rendered images of the models back to 
user client requests. The 3D geometry is thus safe 
from all types of graphics pipeline attacks (except 
reconstruction from images), although the server 
itself is still vulnerable to direct attack.
After experimenting with a number of these 
approaches, we have pursued remote rendering as 
the best solution for protected sharing of 3D cultural 
heritage models. Implementing many of the other 
methods relies on “security through obfuscation,” 
which is unsound from a computer security 
perspective. Hardware GPU decryption is a robust 
idea, but will require industry standardization before it 
is widely deployable. Image-based techniques require 
huge unwieldy data files, and encrypted computation 
rendering methods need further fundamental 
research before they might be tractable.
3. Remote Rendering for Protected 
Sharing of 3D Models
We have developed a remote rendering system with 
a client­server architecture to provide controlled, 
protected access to collections of 3D cultural heritage 
models (Fig. 1). Users employ a special 3D client 
viewer program to interactively view the protected 3D 
content. The program includes very low-resolution, 
decimated versions of the 3D models, that can be 
interactively rotated, zoomed, and illuminated by the 
user in real time. When the user stops manipulating 
the low­resolution model, detected by a “mouse up” 
event, the client program queries the remote rendering 
server via the network for a matching image rendered 
from the high­resolution model data, which replaces 
the low­resolution rendering seen by the user (Fig. 2). 
Fig. 1. Architecture of the remote rendering system.
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On computer networks with reasonably low latencies, 
the user thus has the impression of manipulating a 
high-resolution version of the model. In typical use 
involving digitized cultural heritage artifacts, we 
use models with approximately 10,000 polygons 
for the low resolution version, whereas the server­
side models often contain tens of millions polygons. 
Such low-resolution model complexities are of little 
value to potential attackers, yet still provide adequate 
reference for the user to navigate about the model.
The remote rendering server receives rendering 
requests from users’ client programs, renders 
corresponding images, and passes them back to 
the clients. The rendering server is implemented 
as a module running under the Apache 2.0 HTTP 
Server, communicating with client programs using 
the standard HTTP protocol and taking advantage of 
the wide variety of access protection and monitoring 
tools built into the Web server software. As render 
requests are received from clients, the server checks 
their validity and dispatches valid requests to a GPU 
for OpenGL hardware-accelerated rendering. The 
rendered images are read back from the framebuffer, 
compressed using JPEG compression, and then 
returned to the client. The server uses level-of-detail 
techniques to speed the rendering of highly complex 
models and maintain high throughput rates. In 
practice, an individual server node with a Pentium 4 
CPU and NVIDIA GeForce 4 video card can handle 
a maximum of 8 typical client requests per second; 
the bottlenecks are in the rendering and readback 
stage (about 100 milliseconds) and in the JPEG 
compression step (approximately 25 milliseconds). 
Incoming request sizes are about 700 bytes each, and 
the images returned from our servers average 30 kB 
per request.
The benefit of using a remote image rendering 
system to share 3D models is that the high-resolution 
model geometry data is never made available to 
potential attackers; only 3D reconstruction from 
the 2D images remains as a possible attack. General 
3D reconstruction from images is a very challenging 
computer vision research problem. However, 
synthetic graphics renderings can be particularly 
susceptible to reconstruction, since the human effort 
to harvest a large number of images is low, and the 
attacker may be able to exactly specify the parameters 
used to create the images. Moreover, synthetic 
images are potentially perfect, with no sensor noise 
or miscalibration errors.
To combat such reconstruction attacks, we 
implement a number of defenses in our rendering 
server system. To deter image harvesting attacks, 
we perform automatic analysis of the server logs, 
detecting suspicious sequences or frequencies of 
image requests. We employ obfuscation to create 
hurdles for attackers by encrypting the rendering 
request messages sent from the client programs, 
as well as by encrypting the low­resolution client­
side 3D models. The server imposes constraints on 
rendering requests, disallowing extremely close-up 
views of models, and requiring fixed view frustum 
dimensions. Finally, we add a number of perturbations 
and distortions to the images that are returned from 
the server. These image distortions are applied in a 
psuedorandom manner, so that their effects can not 
be easily modeled and reversed, and the magnitudes 
of the distortions are limited so as not to distract 
non-malicious users viewing the models. The types 
of distortions that we employ include nonlinear 
image warps, adding high-frequency noise to images, 
Fig. 2. Client-side low resolution (left) and server-side high resolution (right) model renderings.
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and perturbing the lighting parameters slightly from 
those being requested by the client.
We have experimentally validated the 
effectiveness of these defenses against a variety 
of traditional computer vision reconstruction 
techniques, including shape-from-silhouette, shape-
from­shading, and stereo reconstruction methods 
(Koller et al. 2004). Additionally, we have performed 
a series of psychological user studies to evaluate 
the perceptual effects of our distortions upon users 
of the graphics system, and to determine the ideal 
magnitudes for perturbations that minimize user 
distraction while still adequately defending against 
reconstruction attacks (Zhu et al. 2008). Ultimately, 
however, we know of no formalism for rigorously 
analyzing the security provided by our systems­
based approach to protecting 3D models, and there 
is inevitably an “arms race” between the possible 
attacks and countermeasures.
4. Results
The protected graphics software client that we 
developed (named ScanView) has been made freely 
available for over four years. In that time, more than 
50,000 unique users have downloaded the software 
and used it to access protected 3D archives containing 
approximately 1,300 different models. Many of these 
3D models belong to prominent collections of laser 
scanned cultural heritage objects, including several 
statues of the Stanford Digital Michelangelo Project, 
and hundreds of archaeological fragments from the 
Digital Forma Urbis Romae Project. In addition, 
we have shared the server software with other 
institutions interested in hosting their 3D model 
archives using their own installation of the protected 
graphics system. We continue to seek collaborators 
in using these techniques, and believe that the results 
of our research is encouraging wider dissemination 
of digitized 3D cultural heritage objects that would 
otherwise be of limited access due to intellectual 
property concerns.
User feedback has been uniformly positive. 
Fetching high­resolution renderings over 
intercontinental broadband Internet connections 
incurs less than 2 seconds of latency, while faster 
continental connections generally experience 
latencies dominated by the processing time of the 
rendering server. The render server architecture can 
scale up to support an arbitrary number of requests 
per second, and servers can be installed at distributed 
locations around the world to reduce long distance 
latencies.
Users of our protected graphics systems have 
included archaeologists, sculptors, art students, 
and a wide variety of lay people. Few of them would 
have qualified under the strict guidelines required to 
obtain unrestricted access to the 3D models in the 
archives, so the protected remote rendering system 
has enabled whole new categories of users access to 
3D graphical models for professional scholarship and 
personal enjoyment. 
5. Future Work
We are actively continuing our development of tools 
for sharing 3D cultural heritage models in a protected 
manner. We are currently extending the ScanView 
client to have wider appeal and functionality. First, 
we are porting the client software to run inside 
Web browsers, rather than requiring the user to 
initially download a standalone executable program. 
Secondly, we are adding capability to the system to 
allow specification and remote rendering of complete 
video sequences. This approach uses a coarser-
grained communication between the client and 
server, and may be appropriate when users desire to 
pre-compute a smooth walkthrough visualization of 
a large model such as an archaeological site.
One direction for further research is analysis of 
computer vision techniques that specifically address 
3D reconstruction of synthetic data under antagonistic 
conditions, to increase our understanding of the 
efficacy of such attacks against the remote rendering 
server defenses. Another question is how to allow 
users a greater degree of geometric analysis of 
protected 3D models without further exposing 
the data to theft; scholarly users have expressed 
interest in measuring distances and plotting profiles 
of 3D objects for analytical purposes beyond the 
simple 3D viewing supported in the current remote 
rendering system. Finally, there is continued interest 
in alternative approaches to protecting 3D graphics 
besides remote rendering, including specialized 
systems that make data security a priority while 
sacrificing some general purpose computing platform 
capabilities. A GPU decryption scheme, for example, 
may be appropriate for console devices or other 
custom graphics systems.
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